Autoepistemic logic extends propositional logic by the modal operator L. A formula ϕ that is preceded by an L is said to be "believed." The logic was introduced by Moore in 1985 for modeling an ideally rational agent's behavior and reasoning about his own beliefs. In this article we analyze all Boolean fragments of autoepistemic logic with respect to the computational complexity of the three most common decision problems expansion existence, brave reasoning and cautious reasoning. As a second contribution we classify the computational complexity of checking that a given set of formulae characterizes a stable expansion and that of counting the number of stable expansions of a given knowledge base. We improve the best known p 2 -upper bound on the former problem to completeness for the second level of the Boolean hierarchy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper analyzing counting problem for autoepistemic logic.
INTRODUCTION
Nonmonotonic logics are among the most important calculi in the area of knowledge representation and reasoning. Autoepistemic logic, introduced 1985 by Moore [1985] , is one of the most prominent nonmonotonic logics. It was originally created to overcome difficulties present in the nonmonotonic modal logics proposed by McDermott and Doyle [1980] , but was also shown to offer a unified approach to other models of nonmonotonic reasoning: it is known to embed McCarthy's circumscription [McCarthy 1980 ] and Reiter's default logic [Reiter 1980 ] under a certain types of translation, and can be used to define the semantics of logic programs [Lifschitz and Schwarz 1993; Marek and Truszczynski 1991] . Results. In this article, we study the computational complexity of the three decision problems mentioned previously for fragments of autoepistemic logic, given by restricting the propositional part, that is, by restricting the set of allowed Boolean connectives. We bound the complexity of all three reasoning tasks for all finite sets of allowed Boolean functions. This approach has first been taken by Lewis, who showed that the satisfiability problem for (pure) propositional logic is NP-complete if the negation of the implication (x y) can be composed from the set of available Boolean connectives, and is polynomial-time solvable in all other cases. Since then, this approach has been applied to a wide range of problems including equivalence and implication problems [Beyersdorff et al. 2009a; Reith 2003 ], satisfiability and model checking in modal and temporal logics [Bauland et al. 2006 [Bauland et al. , 2009a [Bauland et al. , 2009b Meier et al. 2008 ], default logic [Beyersdorff et al. 2009b ], circumscription [Thomas 2009 ], abduction [Creignou et al. 2010a] , and argumentation [Creignou et al. 2010b ].
Our contributions are theoretical in nature and aim to understand the sources of hardness as well as to provide an understanding which connectives take the role of (x y) in the context of autoepistemic logic. Furthermore our results exhibit new fragments of lower complexity which might lead to better algorithms for cases in which the set of Boolean connectives can be restricted. Our results might be of interest for knowledge representation and reasoning, however we cannot judge this at the moment.
Though at first sight, an infinite number of sets B of allowed propositional connectives have to be examined, we prove, making use of results from universal algebra, that essentially only seven cases can occur: (1) B can express all Boolean connectives, (2) B can express all monotone Boolean connectives, (3) B can express all linear connectives, (4) B is equivalent to {∨}, (5) B is equivalent to {∧}, (6) B is equivalent to {¬}, (7) B is empty. We first show, extending Gottlob's results, that these problems are complete for a class from the second level of the polynomial hierarchy for the cases (1) and (2). In case (4) the complexity drops to completeness for a class from the first level of the hierarchy, whereas for (3) the problem becomes solvable in polynomial time while being hard for ⊕L. Finally, for the cases from (5) to (7) it even drops down to solvability in logarithmic space.
Beyond the expansion existence and the brave and cautious reasoning problems, we also study the complexity of the problem to verify that a given set of formulae characterizes a stable expansion of a given knowledge base. This problem has first been studied by Niemelä [1991] , who showed that stable expansions can be characterized by the truth assignment made to the L-prefixed formulae in the given knowledge base.
He showed that this problem in contained in p 2 . We prove that this problem is actually contained in DP (i.e., the second level of the Boolean hierarchy) in general and remains hard for DP for the cases (1) and (2). In case (3) the problem becomes ⊕L-complete, and is decidable in logarithmic space in the cases from (4) to (7) .
Thus, in summary the question for fragments of lower complexity that are yet expressive can be settled in a negative way: As the expressive power of the L-operator alone is enough to simulate negations, only very weak fragments of autoepistemic logic admit for efficient decision procedures. However, in the case for affine sets of Boolean connectives, our results indicate that the extension of systems of linear equations with a belief operator able to express that a variable takes the value 1 in all solutions does not increase the complexity of deciding the existence of solutions by much-the problem remains efficiently solvable. However, whether any such system can be transformed back to a traditional system of linear equation in polynomial-time remains open (cf. the complexity of the expansion existence problem).
Besides the decision variant, another natural question is concerned with the number of stable expansions. This refers to the so called counting problem for stable expansions. Recently, counting problems have gained quite a lot of attention in nonmonotonic logics. For circumscription, the counting problem (that is, determining the number of minimal models of a propositional formula) has been studied in Durand et al. [2005] and Durand and Hermann [2008] . For propositional abduction, a different nonmonotonic logic, some complexity results for the counting problem (that is, computing the number of so called "solutions" of a propositional abduction problem) were presented in [Creignou et al. 2010a; Hermann and Pichler 2007] . Algorithms based on bounded treewidth have been proposed in Jakl et al. [2008] for the counting problems in abduction and circumscription.
Here, we consider the complexity of the problem to count the number of stable expansions for a given knowledge base. To the best of our knowledge, this problem is addressed here for the first time. We show that in general it is #·coNP-complete under parsimonious reductions, a class for which few natural problems are known to be complete under this strict type of reductions. More precisely, we show that the expansion counting problem is #·coNP-complete in cases (1) and (2), drops to #P-completeness for the case (4), and is polynomial-time computable in cases (3) and (5) to (7). Related Work. Similar complexity classifications have also been conducted for other nonmonotonic logics, namely default logic [Beyersdorff et al. 2009b ] and circumscription [Thomas 2009 ]. Autoepistemic logic is known to embed circumscription [Niemelä 1993 ] and to be itself embeddable into default logic [Janhunen 1999 ] using modular polynomial-time transformations. Beyond, using a weaker notions of translations, a nonmodular translation from default logic into autoepistemic logic exists [Gottlob 1995] . Consequently, the question arises whether results obtained in this article are subsumed by results from Beyersdorff et al. [2009b] and Thomas [2009] . That this is not the case, as follows from the fact that all of the three mentioned translation require the Boolean connectives {→, ¬}, which alone suffice to simulate all Boolean connectives. Our results can rather be interpreted as complementary in the sense that differences in the computational complexity of fragments of these logics can be accounted for by the approach to model nonmonotonicity in the respective logic.
For example, consider the set B = {∧, ∨}. From the results obtained in this article and in Beyersdorff et al. [2009b] , it follows that autoepistemic logic restricted to Bformulae cannot be translated into default logic restricted to B -formulae unless [B ∪ {1}] = BF. This indeed holds for all sets B such that M ⊆ [B ∪ {0, 1}].
Although the #·coNP-hardness of the circumscriptive model problem under subtractive reductions can be transferred to the expansion existence problem via the translation from Niemelä [1993] , membership in #·coNP and #·coNP-hardness under parsimonious reductions cannot be obtained in this way.
Organization of the Article. Sections 2 and 3 contain preliminaries and the formal definition of autoepistemic logic. In Section 4 we classify the complexity of the decision problems mentioned previously for all finite sets of allowed Boolean functions. Section 5 contains the classification of the problem to count the number of stable expansions. The interrelationship of the fragments of autoepistemic logic with those of default logic and circumscription resulting from the results in this article are then treated in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the results.
PRELIMINARIES
We use standard notions of complexity theory. For decision problem, the arising complexity degrees encompass the classes L, P, NP, coNP, p 2 , and p 2 . For more background information, the reader is referred to Papadimitriou [1994] . We furthermore require the class DP defined as {A ∩ B | A ∈ NP, B ∈ coNP} and the class ⊕L defined as the class of languages L such that there exists a nondeterministic logspace Turing machine that exhibits an odd number of accepting paths on input x iff x ∈ L for all x [Buntrock et al. 1992] . It is known that L ⊆ ⊕L ⊆ P. Regarding hardness proofs of decision problems, we consider logspace many-one reductions, defined as follows: a language A is logspace many-one reducible to some language
In the context of counting problems, denote by FP the set of all functions computable in polynomial time, and for an arbitrary complexity class C, define #·C as the class the functions f for which there exists a set A ∈ C (the witness set for f ) such that there exists a polynomial p such that for all (x, y) ∈ A, |y| ≤ p(x) , and f (x) = {y | (x, y) ∈ A} , [Hemaspaandra and Vollmer 1995] . In particular, we make use of the classes #P = #·P and #·coNP. To obtain hardness results for counting problems, we will employ parsimonious reductions defined as follows: A counting function f parsimoniously reduces to function h if there is a function g ∈ FP such that for all x, f (x) = h g(x) . Note the analogy to the simple m-reductions for decision problems already defined.
We moreover assume familiarity with propositional logic. As we are going to consider problems parameterized by the set of Boolean connectives, we require some algebraic tools to classify the complexity of the infinitely many arising problems. A clone is a set B of Boolean functions that is closed under superposition, that is, B contains all projections and is closed under arbitrary compositions (see Pippenger [1997, Chapter 1] or Böhler et al. [2003] ). For a set B of Boolean functions, we denote by [B] the smallest clone containing B and call B a base for [B]. Post classified the lattice of all clones and found a finite base for each clone [Post 1941] . A list of all Boolean clones together with a basis for each of them can be found, for instance, in Böhler et al. [2003] . In order to introduce the clones relevant to this article, say that an n-ary Boolean func-
and variables x 1 , . . . , x n . The clones relevant to this article together with their bases are listed in Table I .
AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC
Autoepistemic logic extends propositional logic by a modal operator L stating that its argument is "believed". Syntactically, the set of autoepistemic formulae L ae is defined via ϕ ::= p | f (ϕ, . . . , ϕ) | Lϕ, where f is a Boolean function and p is a proposition. 
The consequence relation |= of the underlying propositional logic is extended to L ae by simply treating Lϕ as an atomic formula. An (autoepistemic) B-formula is an autoepistemic formula using only functions from a finite set B of Boolean functions as connectives. The set of all autoepistemic B-formulae will be denoted by L ae (B). Let B be any finite set of Boolean functions. For ⊆ L ae (B), we write Th( ) for the deductive closure of , that is, Th( ) := {ϕ ∈ L ae | |= ϕ}, and ¬ for {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ }. For ϕ ∈ L ae (B), let SF(ϕ) be the set of its subformulae and let SF L (ϕ) := {Lψ | Lψ ∈ SF(ϕ)} be the set of its L-prefixed subformulae. These notions are canonically extended to sets of formulae.
The key notion in autoepistemic logic are stable sets of beliefs grounded on the given premises (the knowledge of the agent). These sets, called stable expansions, are defined as the fixed points of the consequences of knowledge and belief. . On the other hand, if Lrickshaw is not contained in , then we cannot derive threeWheeler from Th( ∪ L( ) ∪ ¬L(¯ )), which implies ¬LthreeWheeler ∈ ¬L(¯ ) ⊆ . Thus, any stable expansion has to satisfy LthreeWheeler ∈ iff Lrickshaw ∈ .
To see that the given sets characterize stable expansions, observe that {Lrickshaw, LthreeWheeler} ⊆ implies that rickshaw, threeWheeler ∈ Th( ∪ L( ) ∪ ¬L(¯ )) = , whereas {¬Lrickshaw, ¬LthreeWheeler} ⊆ implies that neither rickshaw nor threeWheeler can be derived from ∪ L( ) ∪ ¬L(¯ ). Thus both sets can be extended to yield a stable expansion.
The three main decision problems in the context of autoepistemic logic are deciding whether a given set of premises has a stable expansion, and deciding whether a given formula in contained in at least one (resp. all) stable expansion. As we are to study the complexity of these problems for finite restricted sets B of Boolean functions, we formally define the expansion existence problem as follows.
Problem ∈ MEM c (B). A central tool for the study of the computational complexity of these problems is the following finitary characterization of stable expansions given by Niemelä [1991] .
(1) Let be a -full set, then for every Lϕ ∈ SF L ( ) either Lϕ ∈ or ¬Lϕ ∈ .
(2) The stable expansions of and -full sets are in one-to-one correspondence.
It is not hard to see that any stable expansion contains a full set. As an intuitive explanation for the converse direction, observe that any set such that for all Lϕ ∈ SF L ( ) either Lϕ ∈ or ¬Lϕ ∈ fixes the set of beliefs occurring in . Thus, full sets can be interpreted as minimal justified sets of beliefs. Using an hierarchic construction, it can now be shown that these suffice determine all derived beliefs.
Using the finitary characterization of stable expansions as full sets, one can also define the expansion checking problem as the problem to decide, given two sets and of autoepistemic formulae, whether is -full. Problem: FULL(B) Input: A finite set ⊆ L ae (B) and a finite set ⊆ SF L ( ) ∪ ¬SF L ( ) Output: Is a -full set? Notice also that Lemma 3.4 actually yields a characterization of stable expansions that is polynomial in the size of the given set . To make this characterization more precise, say that a formula is quasi-atomic if it is atomic or else begins with an L. Further denote by SF q (ϕ) the set of all maximal quasi-atomic subformulae of ϕ (in the sense that a quasi-atomic subformula is maximal if it is not a subformula of another quasi-atomic subformula of ϕ). Write SE( ) for the stable expansion corresponding to and say that is its kernel.
Definition 3.5. Let ⊆ L ae and let ϕ ∈ L ae . We define the consequence relation |= L recursively as
The point in defining the consequence relation |= L is that, once a -full set has been determined, it describes membership in the stable expansion corresponding to for arbitrary L ae -formulae ϕ.
To illustrate the concept of a kernel, recall car from Example 3.2. The kernel of the stable expansion containing Lrickshaw is 1 := {Lrickshaw, LthreeWheeler}; the kernel of the stable expansion containing ¬Lrickshaw is 2 := {¬Lrickshaw, ¬LthreeWheeler}. Clearly, car ∪ 2 |= L fourWheeler.
COMPLEXITY RESULTS
The complexity of the before defined decision problems for autoepistemic logic has already been investigated by Niemelä [1991] and Gottlob [1992] . Niemelä [1991] proved that in order to show that a set is -full, we may simply check whether it satisfies the conditions given in Definition 3.3. Thus the problem of verifying full sets Turing-reduces to the propositional implication problem, which yields membership in p 2 . Consequently, the problem of deciding whether has a stable expansion is nondeterministically Turing-reducible to the propositional implication problem and therefore contained in p 2 (Lemma 3.4). According to Definition 3.5 and Lemma 3.6 the problem of deciding whether there exists a stable expansion containing a given formula φ can be solved with a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle by a nondeterministic Turing reduction as follows. Guess a subset ; check that is -full and check that φ ∈ SE( ). Therefore, the brave reasoning problem is in p 2 , whereas the cautious reasoning problem is in p 2 . For the expansion existence, the brave reasoning and the cautious reasoning problem, corresponding hardness results were obtained by Gottlob [1992] . More precisely he obtained completeness results for the special case B = {∧, ∨, ¬}.
We investigate here the complexity of these problems for every B. Observe that the upper bounds, that is, membership in p 2 (resp. p 2 and p 2 ) still hold for any B. In order to classify the complexity for the infinitely many cases of B we will make use of Post's lattice as follows: Suppose that B ⊆ [B ] for some finite sets B, B of Boolean functions. Then every function in B can be expressed as a composition of functions from B ; in other words: for every f ∈ B there is a propositional formula φ f over connectives from B defining f , and every L ae (B)-formula can be transformed into an equivalent L ae (B )-formula. If moreover in the formulae φ f every free variable appears only once (in this case we say that φ f is a small formula for f ; and in the proofs below we will see that we can always construct such small formulae), then the transformation of a L ae (B)-formula ψ into an equivalent L ae (B )-formula ψ is efficient in the sense that the length of ψ can be bounded by a polynomial in the length of ψ: replacing all . This already brings some structure into the infinitely many problems EXP(B ).
We next note that we may w.l.o.g. assume the availability of the Boolean constants. PROOF. For the nontrivial direction, let ∈ L ae . We map to := [1/t, 0/L f ]∪{t}, where t and f are fresh propositions. Then the stable expansions of and are in one-to-one correspondence, as any expansion of includes t and ¬L f : Since f occurs in the scope of an L-operator only, it cannot be derived from unless is inconsistent. Thus, by definition of stable expansions and Lemma 3.6, any stable expansion has to contain ¬L f .
As a consequence of Lemma 4.1, it suffices to consider the clones of the form [B ∪ {0, 1}] (as can be seen immediately from the list of clones given in Böhler et al. [2003] ). These are the seven clones I, N, V, E, L, M, and BF (see Figure 1 ). All other cases will have the same complexity of these, by the previous explanations. Before we start proving our classification, we note one further observation:
PROOF. Suppose that L ae is a stable expansion of and let denote its kernel. Then ∪ |= L 0 by virtue of Lemma 3.6. As ∪ |= L 0 iff ∪ |= 0, we obtain = SF L ( ) (notice that {Lχ | Lχ ∈ SF q (0)} = ∅, cf. Definition 3.5). In conclusion, ∪ SF L ( ) must be inconsistent. Conversely suppose that ∪ SF L ( ) is inconsistent. Then so is Th( ∪ L(L ae )). Consequently, any stable expansion must contain all autoepistemic formulae. 
Expansion Existence
The proof of this theorem requires several propositions. PROOF. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions as required. We have to prove p 2 -hardness. Let ϕ := ∃x 1 · · · ∃x n ∀y 1 · · · ∀y m ψ be a quantified Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form. Gottlob [1992] , shows that ϕ is valid iff the set := {Lψ, Lx 1 ↔ x 1 , . . . , Lx n ↔ x n } has a stable expansion. The idea of our proof is to modify the given ACM 
Clearly, ⊆ L ae ({∧, ∨}). Moreover, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that any consistent stable expansion of contains either Lx i or Lx i but not both: assume that is a -full set such that Lx i ∈ and Lx i ∈ . Then, by definition of , ∪ |= x i and ∪ |= x i , although Lx i , Lx i ∈ ; a contradiction to being -full. Otherwise, if were a -full set such that ¬Lx i ∈ and ¬Lx i ∈ , then ∪ |= x i and ∪ |= x i , a contradiction to being -full, because Lx i , Lx i / ∈ . In conclusion, any -full set and equivalently any consistent stable expansion of contains either Lx i or Lx i but not both.
We show that has a stable expansion if and only if ϕ is valid. First suppose that has a stable expansion . Let denote its kernel. As ∪ SF L ( ) is consistent, we obtain that = L ae from Lemma 4.2. By the given argument, either Lx i ∈ or Lx i ∈ , but not both. Moreover, Lψ ∈ , whence ψ must be derivable from ∪ by Definition 3.3. Note that this implies that ψ is satisfied by all assignments setting either y i or y i to 1; in particular, by all assignments that assign a complementary value to y i and y i for every i. Define a truth assignment σ :
Now suppose that ϕ is valid. Then there exists an assignment σ :
∪ |= x i then ¬Lx i has to be in , because x i occurs in Lψ and the clause Lx i ∨ x i only. From this, we obtain Lx i ∈ . Therefore, ∪ |= x i if and only if Lx i ∈ . From the definition of now follows that ∪ |= x i if and only if ¬Lx i ∈ . The same holds for x i for each i. Due to the construction of , the fact that the clause y i ∨ y i enforces y i to be assigned a value equal to or bigger than the one assigned to ¬y i , the definition of ψ and its monotonicity, we also have ∪ |= ψ . Hence, following Definition 3.3, is a -full set and, by Lemma 3.4, has a stable expansion. Finally, note that in any finite set of Boolean functions B such that M ⊆ [B], conjunction, and disjunction can be defined by small formulae, that is, there exist formulae φ ∧ ≡ x ∧ y and φ ∨ ≡ x ∨ y such that x and y occur exactly once in these formulae, see Schnoor [2010] .
We cannot transfer this result to EXP(B) for [B] = V, because we may not assume ψ to be in conjunctive normal form. But, using a similar idea, we can show that the problem is NP-complete. To show NP-hardness, we reduce 3SAT to EXP(B) as follows. Let ϕ := 1≤i≤n c i with clauses c i = i1 ∨ i2 ∨ i3 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be given and let x 1 , . . . , x m enumerate the propositions occurring in ϕ. From ϕ we construct the set
Analogously to Lemma 4.4, we obtain that for any stable expansion of either x i ∈ or x i ∈ , but not both. First, suppose that is a stable expansion of . It is easily observed that ∪ SF L ( ) is consistent, therefore = L ae . Let be the kernel of . As = L ae and Lc i ∈ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Definition 3.3 implies that ∪ |= L c i and hence ∪ |= c i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. From this it follows that ϕ is satisfied by the assignment σ setting σ (x i ) = 1 iff Lx i ∈ .
Conversely, suppose that ϕ is satisfied by the assignment σ . Define the set :
As σ |= c i for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we obtain that ∪ |= c i . Concluding, is a -full set.
Next, we turn to the case [B∪{0, 1}] = L. Say that an L-prefixed formula is L-atomic if it is of the form Lϕ for some atomic formula ϕ.
LEMMA 4.6. Let ⊆ L ae ({⊕, 1}). If SF L ( ) contains only L-atomic formulae, then one can decide in polynomial time whether has a stable expansion.
PROOF. The idea is to use Gaussian elimination twice. Let be as required and suppose that consists of m formulas. Then the set can be seen as a system of linear equations and thus written as Ax = By ⊕ C, where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) T , y = (Lx 1 , . . . , Lx n ) T , A and B are Boolean matrices having m rows, and C is a Boolean vector.
By applying Gaussian elimination to A we obtain an equivalent system A x = B y ⊕ C with an upper triangular matrix A . Let r denote the number of free variables in A x and suppose w.l.o.g. that these are x 1 , . . . , x r . By subsequently eliminating the variables x r+1 , . . . , x n , we arrive at a system T equivalent to of the form:
where for each i the functions f i and g i are linear, and c i is the constant 0 or 1 (recall that all L-prefixed formulae in are L-atomic). The number of equations in T is still m.
Observe that ∪ SF L ( ) is inconsistent iff T[Lx 1 /1, . . . Lx n /1] has no solution. In this case has L ae as a stable expansion. Let us now show how to construct a -full set such that SE( ) = L ae .
Since the variables x 1 , . . . , x r are free, they cannot be derived from ∪ whatever is. The same occurs for every i ≥ r + 1 such that f i (x 1 , . . . , x r ) is not a constant function. Suppose this is the case for r + 1 ≤ i ≤ s. Then any -full set has to contain ¬Lx j for 1 ≤ j ≤ s. Let T be the system obtained by considering all remaining equations while replacing Lx i with 0 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ s. For each equation in T , the function f i (if present) is a constant function ε i . Therefore T consists of the following equations: (Lx s+1 , . . . , Lx n ) := g i (0, . . . , 0, Lx s+1 , . . . , Lx n ) for s < i ≤ m + r. Thus, for every ⊆ SF L ( ) ∪ ¬SF L ( ) such that {¬Lx 1 , . . . , ¬Lx s } ⊆ and every i, ∪ |= x i (resp., ∪ |= x i ) if and only if T ∪ |= x i (resp., T ∪ |= x i ).
We claim that the solution of the system T [x s+1 /Lx s+1 , . . . , x n /Lx n ] are in oneto-one correspondence with the -full sets corresponding to the consistent stable expansions of . From this, we are able conclude, as has a stable expansion iff T[Lx 1 /1, . . . Lx n /1] has no solution (in this case L ae is a stable expansion) or T [x s+1 /Lx s+1 , . . . , x n /Lx n ] has at least one solution.
Before actually proving the claim, let us illustrate the described procedure. Consider the set :
From we obtain the following system Ax = By ⊕ C of linear equations (assuming all formulae in need to be fulfilled, and thus all equations in the corresponding system equal 1):
After performing Gaussian elimination on A, we arrive at ⎛ ⎜ ⎝
which yields the following system T:
As T[Lx 1 /1, Lx 2 /1, Lx 3 /1] is consistent, L ae is no stable expansion of . Further, in T the function f 1 is not constant. Therefore the system T is given by the second and third equation with Lx 1 replaced by 0:
The system T [x 2 /Lx 2 , x 3 /Lx 3 ] now has four solutions, namely (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), and (1, 1, 1). Concluding, possesses four stable expansions. 
To prove the claim, let = {¬Lx 1 , . . . , ¬Lx s } ∪ {¬Lx i | i ∈ I} ∪ {Lx j | j ∈ J} be a -full set. Observe that ∪ is consistent and that either T ∪ |= x i or T ∪ |= ¬x i , for each i. Denote by λ the truth assignment induced by on SF L ( ). Then, for every
Hence, is a -full set. This proves the claim.
Note that solving this last system by Gaussian elimination also gives the total number of possible -full sets: the number of consistent stable expansions is equal to the number of solutions of T [x s+1 /Lx s+1 , . . . , x n /Lx n ]; (while testing for the inconsistent stable expansion can also be accomplished in polynomial-time as seen at the beginning of the proof ). PROOF. Let B be as required and be a set of autoepistemic B-formulae. Then can be written in polynomial time as a set c k ⊕ i∈I k x i k ∈ N, c k ∈ {0, 1} , where k is the number of equations in (see, Beyersdorff et al. [2009a] ).
We transform this set to as follows: considering the formulae in SF L ( ) ordered by their length, introduce a fresh variable y ϕ for every nonatomic formula ϕ such that Lϕ ∈ SF L ( ); add the equations y ϕ ↔ ϕ; and replace all occurrences of Lϕ by Ly ϕ . We claim that the -full sets and the -full sets are in one-to-one correspondence. This establishes the upper bound, because satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4.6. To prove the claim, we give an inductive argument on the number of non-L-atomic formulae in : Suppose that contains m non-L-atomic formulae, and that the claim is satisfied for all m < m. Further let ⊆ SF L ( ) ∪ ¬SF L ( ). Then contains a non-L-atomic subformula Lϕ ∈ SF L ( ) such that all formulae in SF L (ϕ) are L-atomic. Define
That is, ϕ differs from in that we substituted Lϕ with Ly ϕ , and added the formula ϕ ⊕ y ϕ ⊕ 1. Observe that ∪ |= ϕ iff ϕ ∪ ϕ |= y ϕ . Therefore, since Lϕ ∈ iff Ly ϕ ∈ ϕ and ¬Lϕ ∈ iff ¬Ly ϕ ∈ ϕ , it holds that is -full iff ϕ is ϕ -full.
By induction hypothesis, there now exists a set ϕ of autoepistemic formulae such that all formulae in SF L ( ϕ ) are L-atomic, ϕ ⊕ y ϕ ⊕ 1 ∈ SF L ( ϕ ), and the ϕ -full sets and ϕ -full sets are in one-to-one correspondence. Let ϕ ⊆ SF L ( ϕ ) ∪ ¬SF L ( ϕ ) and define
Then, by analogous arguments, ϕ is ϕ -full if and only if is -full. Hence, the stable expansions of and ϕ , of ϕ and ϕ , and of ϕ and are in one-to-one correspondence. This proves the claim.
It hence remains to establish ⊕L-hardness. We give a reduction from IMP(B) for [B ∪ {0, 1}] = L, that is, the problem to decide whether |= ψ for a given set of B-formulae and a given B-formula ψ. Since IMP(B From this theorem and its proof one can easily settle the complexity of the existence of a consistent stable expansion as well as the complexity of the brave and cautious reasoning. 
The proof of Theorem 4.10 will be established from the following three lemmas. PROOF. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions as required. To prove membership in DP, we give a simple reduction to the canonical DP-complete problem SAT-UNSAT. Given an instance ( , ) of FULL(B), we first construct the sets
where is obtained from by substituting Lϕ with 1 if Lϕ ∈ , and Lϕ with 0 otherwise. Observe that elements of S 1 and S 2 are sets of propositional formulae. It now holds that ( , ) ∈ FULL(B) iff all sets of formulae in S 1 are satisfiable while all sets of formulae in S 2 are unsatisfiable. Thus, ( , ) → (S 1 , S 2 ) gives a polynomialtime many-one reduction from FULL(B) to SAT-UNSAT ∈ DP. The claim follows from the closure of DP under such reductions.
To prove DP-hardness, we give a reduction from the DP-complete problem CRITSAT [Papadimitriou and Wolfe 1988] , which is the problem of deciding whether a given formula in conjunctive normal form is unsatisfiable but removing any of its clauses makes it satisfiable.
The reduction will use the following mapping: Let ϕ be a given propositional formula in conjunctive normal form over propositions x 1 , . . . , x n . Write ψ for the negation normal form of ¬ϕ. Denote by ψ the formula obtained from ψ by replacing all negative literals x i by fresh propositions y i . Then it holds that ϕ is unsatisfiable iff n i=1 (x i ∨ y i ) |= ψ . Notice that these formulae are monotone. Define g to be the mapping from ϕ to the B-representation of Lψ . By the arguments from the last paragraph in the proof of Lemma 4.4, we may w.l.o.g. assume that g can be computed in space logarithmic in the length of its argument.
Thus, given an instance ϕ ≡ 1≤i≤m c i of CRITSAT over propositions x 1 , . . . , x n , we map ϕ to the following sets ⊆ L ae ({∧, ∨}) and ⊆ SF L ( ) ∪ ¬SF L ( ):
where ϕ − j denotes the formula 1≤i≤m,i = j c i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m (recall that g maps its argument to an L-prefixed formula).
Observe that if ϕ ∈ CRITSAT, then ϕ is unsatisfiable while all formulae ϕ −i are satisfiable. As a result, any -full set has to contain g(ϕ) and ¬g(ϕ −i ). Thus, we have ∪ |= p i for all -full sets . In particular, is -full. On the other hand, if is -full then, by definition of g(ϕ), ϕ has to be unsatisfiable while ϕ −i is satisfiable for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, ϕ ∈ CRITSAT. PROOF. To prove membership in ⊕L, we will use the result that L ⊕L = ⊕L [Hertrampf et al. 2000] . Given an instance ( , ) of FULL(B), we construct sets of affine formulae equations corresponding to the set of formulae in S 1 and S 2 from the proof of Lemma 4.11:
where is obtained from by substituting Lϕ with 1 if Lϕ ∈ , and Lϕ with 0 otherwise. Analogous to the previous proof, we have that ( , ) ∈ FULL(B) iff each system of linear equations from T 1 has no solutions and each system of linear equations from T 2 has a solution, which can be checked for each system of linear equations with a call to a ⊕L-oracle. As each system of linear equations in T 1 or T 2 can be constructed from ( , ) in logarithmic space Beyersdorff et al. [2009a] , we obtain membership in L ⊕L = ⊕L.
Hardness for ⊕L is apparent from the proof of Lemma 4.7, as the given reduction ( 
where p is a fresh proposition. We claim that ϕ is contained in a stable expansion of iff ∈ EXP(B). First suppose that ϕ is contained in a stable expansion of and let denote its kernel. We claim that := ∪ {Lϕ, Lp} is -full:
Hence, has a stable expansion. Conversely, suppose that ϕ is not bravely entailed. Hence does not have L ae as a stable expansion and ¬Lϕ ∈ for all stable expansions of . Observe that ∪ SF L ( ) = ∪ SF L ( ) ∪ {Lϕ ⊕ p ⊕ 1, Lp} ∪ {Lϕ, Lp} is consistent, therefore L ae is not a stable expansion of . Hence, assume that is a consistent stable expansion of . Then either Lp ∈ or ¬Lp ∈ . In the former case, would also have to contain Lϕ, while ϕ can not be derived. A contradiction to being a stable expansion of . In the latter case, we have that Th( ∪ L( ) ∪ ¬L( )) ⊃ {¬Lp, Lp}. Thus Th( ∪ L( ) ∪ ¬L( )) = L ae ⊃ ;a contradiction to being a stable expansion. We conclude that does not possess any stable expansions. where p is a fresh proposition. We claim that ϕ is contained in any stable expansion of iff ∈ EXP * (B). First suppose that there exists a stable expansion of that does not contain ϕ. Let denote its kernel. Then, for the same arguments as before, := ∪ {¬Lϕ, Lp} is a -full set. Conversely, suppose that ϕ is contained in all stable expansions of .
Let
denote a consistent stable expansion of . If Lp ∈ , then would also have to contain ¬Lϕ, while ϕ can be derived. A contradiction to being a stable expansion of . Otherwise, if ¬Lp ∈ , then ∪ L( ) ∪ ¬L(¯ ) is inconsistent-contradictory to being a consistent stable expansion. We conclude that does not possess any consistent stable expansion. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.14. According to Lemma 4.1 one can suppose w.l.o.g. that B contains the two constants 0 and 1. Since 1 belongs to all stable expansions, a set of B-premises has a stable expansion iff 1 belongs to some stable expansion of . Since 0 does not belong to any consistent stable expansion, a set of B-premises has no consistent stable expansion iff 0 belongs to any stable expansion of . Therefore, the lower bounds follow from Theorem 4.3 and Corollary 4.9.
As for the upper bounds, membership in p 2 and p 2 in the general case follows from the discussion preceding Theorem 4.3.
For [B] ⊆ V the proof of Lemma 4.5 shows that, given ⊆ L ae (B), we can compute a -full set in NP and therefore get a membership result in NP for MEM b (B), resp., in coNP for MEM c (B). By Lemma 3.6, it remains to check whether ∪ |= L ϕ. To this end, we nondeterministically guess a set T ⊆ SF q (ϕ) ∩ SF L (ϕ), verify that ∪ ∪ T ∪ {¬Lχ | Lχ ∈ (SF q (ϕ) ∩ SF L (ϕ)) \ T} |= ϕ, and recursively check that
This recursion terminates after at most |ϕ| steps as |SF q (ϕ) ∩ SF L (ϕ)| ≤ |SF(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ| and ∪ |= L χ iff ∪ |= χ for all propositional formulae χ. This hence constitutes a polynomial-time Turing reduction to the implication problem for propositional Bformulae. As implication testing for B-formulae is in P, we obtain that ∪ |= L ϕ is 
COUNTING COMPLEXITY
Besides deciding existence of stable expansions or entailment of formulae, another natural question is concerned with the total number of stable expansions of a given autoepistemic theory. We define the counting problem for stable expansions as Problem: #EXP(B) Input: A finite set ⊆ L ae (B) Output: The number of stable expansions of . The complexity of this problem is classified by the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.1. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions.
PROOF. We first prove the lower bounds. It is easily observed that the reduction given in the proof of Lemma 4.1 is parsimonious. For the claimed lower bounds it hence suffices to prove the #·coNP-hardness of #EXP(B) for [B] = M and the #P-hardness of #EXP(B) for [B] = V. For the latter, notice that the reduction given in Lemma 4.5 is also a parsimonious reduction from #3SAT, which is #P-complete via parsimonious reductions [Valiant 1979 ]. For the former, notice that the proof of Lemma 4.4 establishes a parsimonious reduction from the problem # 1 SAT, which is #·coNP-complete via parsimonious reductions [Durand et al. 2005] .
We are thus left to prove the upper bounds. Let B be a finite set of Boolean functions such that [B] = BF. In the paragraph starting Section 4, it has been argued that the problem of deciding EXP(B) nondeterministically Turing-reduces to the propositional implication problem (see also Niemelä [1991] ): given ⊆ L ae (B), guess a subset + ⊆ SF L ( ) and verify that := + ∪ {¬Lϕ | ϕ ∈ SF L ( ), Lϕ / ∈ + } is a -full set using the conditions given in Definition 3.3. It is thus clear that #EXP is contained in #·P NP , as a Turing machine implementing the given algorithm can be build in a way such that there is a bijection between its computation paths and the possible sets + . The first claim now follows from #·P NP = #·coNP [Hemaspaandra and Vollmer 1995] .
Next, let B be such that [B] = V. Then there exists a nondeterministic Turing machine M such that the number of accepting paths of M on input ⊆ L ae (B) corresponds to the number of stable expansions of (cf. the proof of Lemma 4.5). Hence, #EXP(B) ∈ #P.
Next, suppose that [B] ⊆ L and let denote the given autoepistemic theory. Let T denote the system of linear equations obtained from in the proofs of Lemma 4.6. Then the number of consistent stable expansions of is equal to the number of solutions of the system T [x s+1 /Lx s+1 , . . . , x n /Lx n ], which can be computed in polynomial time by Gaussian elimination. Moreover, L ae is a stable expansion of iff ∪ SF L ( ) is inconsistent, which is polynomial-time decidable. Hence, #EXP(B) ∈ FP.
Finally, the case [B] ⊆ E follows from the fact that for any ⊆ L ae (B) an equivalent representation ∈ L ae (I) can be computed efficiently.
INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER NONMONOTONIC LOGICS
Having classified the complexity of the expansion existence and the brave and cautious reasoning problems, this section studies the arising implications for translations between autoepistemic logic and Reiter's default logic as well as McCarthy's circumscription. In the interest of space, we will restrict our study to fragments being able to simulate the monotone functions. A complete treatment of the intertranslatability of fragments of autoepistemic logic, default logic and circumscription is given in Thomas [2010] . Where B is a finite set of Boolean functions, denote by B-autoepistemic logic, Bdefault logic, and B-circumscription the respective logic restricted to formulae using Boolean functions from B (for a formal definition of default logic and circumscription, see Reiter [1980] and Lifschitz [1985] ). For any nonmonotonic logical theory T, write T |= c ϕ, if ϕ is cautiously entailed by T, where a formula ϕ is cautiously entailed in autoepistemic logic (resp. default logic, circumscription) if ϕ is contained in all stable expansions (resp. contained in all stable extensions, satisfied in all circumscriptive models) of the given knowledge base. We define a translation f to be a polynomialtime computable function mapping theories from one nonmonotonic logic to another such that the set of cautiously entailed formulae is invariant under f (i.e., T |= c ϕ iff f (T) |= c ϕ). Hence, our notion of translation is quite weak in that it subsumes the notions studied in Gottlob [1995] and Janhunen [1999] . Janhunen [1999] showed that there exists a polynomial-time computable faithful translation from autoepistemic logic to default logic. Theorem 4.3 and results from Beyersdorff et al. [2009b] imply that for fragments of autoepistemic logic able to express ∧ and ∨ this holds only if in default logic we can simulate all Boolean functions. Thus, considering only clones that contain the constant 1, Janhunen's translation is optimal with respect to the required Boolean functions.
As for the reverse direction, there exists a translation from default logic to autoepistemic logic [Gottlob 1995] . Indeed, under our weak notion of translations, there exists a translation from monotone default logic to monotone autoepistemic logic. PROOF. Let B and B be finite sets of Boolean functions as in the statement of the theorem. We split the proof into two cases. If [B ∪ {0, 1}] = BF, then using Lemma 4.1 we can easily adapt the translation given in Gottlob [1995] to map the given B-default theory to a set of autoepistemic B -formulae.
If for fresh, mutually different propositions p α . We define the translation function f to be the mapping (W, D) → , where denotes the B -representation of . To see that f is polynomial-time computable, recall that the consistency of a set of monotone formulae is decidable in polynomial time which is crucial for the justifications β. Further justifications being equal to 0 must not trivially be applied, and justifications being unsatisfiable cannot exist in our monotone case. Furthermore, recall that, for M ⊆ [B ∪ {0, 1}], B efficiently implements ∧ and ∨, see Schnoor [2010] .
To prove correctness of the translation, suppose that (W, D) has the stable extension E. Write GD(E) for the defaults in D that are applicable in E. From the definition of extension (systematically; cf. Reiter [1980] ), it follows that there exists an ordering δ 1 , . . . , δ n of the defaults in GD(E) such that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n and i := Lα j , ¬Lp α j δ j = D) does not have a stable extension. Then there has to exist an applicable default α:β γ ∈ D, whose conclusion is equivalent to 0. By construction, then contains a formula that is equivalent to Lp α . Since the only other occurrence of p α in is in Lα ∨ p α , Lα has to be 0. However, the applicability of α:β γ implies that α can be derived. Therefore, any -full set has to contain Lα. Hence, no consistent stable expansion of may exist.
As for the relation to circumscription, let ≤ (P,Q,Z ) denote the preorder on assignments defined by σ ≤ (P,Q,Z ) σ if σ (q) = σ (q) for all q ∈ Q and σ ( p) ≤ σ ( p) for all p ∈ P. Niemelä [1993] showed that, given a set of propositional formulae and a partition of the propositions occurring in into sets (P, Q, Z ), the minimal models of with respect to ≤ (P,Q,Z ) are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable expansions of
and coincide up to the propositional language. This nicely contrasts with the fact that we cannot map any proper fragment of circumscription to monotone autoepistemic logic: For the converse direction, it was shown that in the general case no translation in the sense of Niemelä [1993] or Janhunen [1999] can exist. Our results show that, unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses to NP, this also holds for monotone autoepistemic logic. 
CONCLUSION
In this article we followed the approach of Lewis [1979] to build formulae from a given finite set B of allowed Boolean functions and studied the complexity of the expansion existence, the brave (resp. cautious) reasoning problem, the expansion checking problem, and the counting problem for stable expansions involving B-formulae.
We showed that for all sets of allowed Boolean functions, the computational complexity of the expansion existence and reasoning problems is divided into four presumably different levels (see Figure 1 and Table II) : all three problems remain complete for classes of the second level of the polynomial hierarchy as long as the connectives ∧ and ∨ can be expressed; if, otherwise, only disjunctions can be expressed the complexity drops to completeness for the first level of the polynomial hierarchy; in all remaining cases, the problems become tractable (either contained in L or contained in P and ⊕L-hard). We obtained a nontrivial polynomial-time upper bound for the case of not-unary affine functions. Note, however that the exact complexity of the problems in this case remains open. This clone has also remained unclassified in a number of previous related works on different modal and nonmonotonic logics [Bauland et al. 2006; Thomas 2009 ].
In addition these problems, we also classified the complexity of the expansion checking problem as being DP-complete as long as the connectives ∧ and ∨ can be expressed; in all other cases, the problem becomes tractable (with this case splitting into ⊕Lcompleteness and membership in L).
As for the problem of counting the number of stable expansions, its computational complexity is trichotomic: #·coNP-complete, #P-complete, or contained in FP. We think it is important to note that for our classification of counting problems the conceptually simple parsimonious reductions are sufficient, while for related classifications in the literature less restrictive (and more complicated) reductions such as subtractive or complementive reductions had to be used [Bauland et al. 2010; Durand et al. 2005; Durand and Hermann 2008] and some of the results of [Hermann and Pichler 2007] ). Parsimonious reductions are not only the conceptually simplest ones since they are direct analogues of the usual many-one reductions among languages. They also form the strongest (strictest) type of reduction with a number of good properties, for instance, all relevant counting classes are closed under parsimonious reductions (and not under the other mentioned types of reductions). Thus, one of the contributions of our article is a natural counting problem complete in the class #·coNP under the simplest type of reductions.
Finally, we examined the interrelationship of autoepistemic logic with the nonmonotonic logics default logic and circumscription. Our results imply that using a comparatively weak notion of translations monotone default logic can be translated to monotone autoepistemic logic, while a translation in the converse direction would imply a collapse of the polynomial-time hierarchy. Similarly, we were able to show that the translation from circumscription to autoepistemic logic given by Niemelä [1993] does not extend to the monotone fragments; this also holds for translations from autoepistemic logic to circumscription, for which the absence of translations was already shown in Niemelä [1993] , although for a stricter type of translations.
